Dignity – Tricking

Tricking into anthropomorphising, within the value of dignity in human-robot interaction, concerns the risk that robots may mislead users, intentionally or not, into forming beliefs about the robot that are not grounded in reality. This is not limited to explicit deception. It also includes subtle forms of anthropomorphic design that encourage users to treat robots as if they have emotions, intentions, or social presence. The concern becomes particularly relevant when robots are deployed in care, education, or domestic environments, where users may be vulnerable or where long-term interaction can shape perceptions and expectations in meaningful ways.

Respecting dignity in this context means ensuring that users are not misled into inappropriate interpretations of a robot's capabilities or "inner life." A robot that simulates emotional responses, for instance, can create confusion about whether those responses are genuine, potentially leading to misplaced trust or emotional attachment. This issue is especially significant in populations for whom the artificial nature of the system may not be immediately obvious, or where cognitive or social vulnerability may reduce the ability to critically interpret the interaction. Design choices therefore directly influence whether interaction remains transparent or drifts into forms of unintended deception.

The literature consistently reflects this tension between useful engagement and problematic illusion. In educational settings, concerns arise that robots may provide incorrect information due to faulty human input, raising issues of trust and reliability. In assistive contexts, robots are sometimes considered for users who may gradually lose the ability to distinguish living from non-living entities, increasing the risk of misinterpretation. Across multiple studies, the idea of "pretend reciprocity" is explicitly questioned, with authors noting that apparent emotional responsiveness does not constitute genuine social relation

This issue becomes more pronounced in care and companionship scenarios. Some analyses argue that meaningful interaction may depend, at least in part, on users attributing emotional states to robots, effectively being "tricked" into social engagement. This raises ethical discomfort when, for example, people express affection toward robots that reciprocate with scripted responses, challenging expectations of authenticity. At the same time, systems like Paro demonstrate that users can derive real emotional comfort even when fully aware of the robot's artificial nature, suggesting a more complex boundary between illusion and acceptance.

Other perspectives highlight that this "delusion" may be context-dependent: for competent users, playful anthropomorphism may be harmless or even enjoyable, similar to projecting personality onto inanimate objects. However, in care contexts, especially with older adults or vulnerable populations, the same mechanisms can raise concerns about infantilisation, consent, and manipulation. Overall, the literature does not reject emotional engagement with robots outright, but it stresses the importance of carefully managing when and how such engagement becomes misleading rather than supportive.